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Accumulation of various factors has led us to the
impasse we are now witnessing in efforts at resolving the Arab-Israeli
conflict through ending Israeli occupation of Palestinian and Arab lands
and the establishment of a viable Palestinian State, living in peace in
the region.
First, the Israeli factor: ever since
the occupation of Palestinian and Arab lands in the June war of 1967,
Israel has not offered a genuine vision for peace. True, there was the
Egypt-Israel peace agreement in the late 70s followed later by the
Jordan-Israel peace agreement. In 2005, Israel disengaged unilaterally
from the Gaza Strip. Some would argue that these involved willingness
for Israeli territorial disengagements but in reality these returned the
lands of others that Israel occupied, at a great cost in the case of
Gaza Strip. But granted that these peace agreements and disengagements
reflected readiness on Israel to undertake territorial compromises, but
is Israel ready to make similar negotiated disengagements in the West
Bank? The facts on the ground speak otherwise; 150 Jewish settlements in
the West Bank which house 270,000 settlers and still expanding; over
500 checkpoints and movement impediments which make mobility and access
not only across West Bank – Israel but within the West Bank itself
impossible for a majority of the population; the separation wall with
over 700 kms of 8-meter long blocks surrounding East Jerusalem,
Bethlehem, Qalqilya, Tulkarm and other towns, villages and localities; a
population control system with special permits and 700 kilometers of
roads in the West Bank for the exclusive use of settlers. The
end-product of these Israeli instituted measures is to allow Israel to
keep tab over the elements necessary for daily living of Palestinians
and to control resources of the West Bank starting with 50% of the land,
according to a recent World Bank report, that is inaccessible to the
Palestinians. From a Palestinian perspective, Israel is becoming a state
of control and does not show at the present the potential of a good
neighbor at peace with its Palestinian neighbors.
The tragedy is that for a majority of Israelis
nowadays, over 56% according to a recent opinion poll, the feeling of
security because of the wall prevails. But this is like turning one’s
back or putting one’s head in the sand and going on thinking that all is
well. The peace groups in Israel have weakened for a number of reasons,
including the occurrence of the second Intifada in September 2000, with
suicide bombing tactics that alienated and or weakened the impact of the
Israeli peace groups in their own society. But perhaps the biggest
factor in the Israeli system which, so far, has not contributed to
serious Israeli search for peace with the Palestinians and with the
Arabs in general is the Israeli reliance on military force. The military
system in Israel is paramount when it comes to preserving the Israeli
ideal of internal security. The severe shock and letdown by the Israeli
military system during the Lebanon War in summer of 2006 has sent waves
of political instability to the system and required a reexamination of
the system and its failures. Yet, even if Israel learns its lessons from
military failure, most likely these lessons would add to the conviction
of Israeli militarists and most Israelis that force and military might
are the best approach when dealing with Palestinians and with Arabs, in
general.
But, again, the Land of Palestine/Israel is a small
land and the demographic equation which has approached the 50-50 mark
with close to 5.5 million Jews and 5.3 million Palestinians of whom 1.4
million (or 20%) live in Israel itself and 3.9 million in the
Palestinian Territories. Some Israelis would argue that separation wall
or no separation wall this is the greatest challenge facing Israel. But
what is the solution? Continued military control over the Palestinians?
More Israeli separation measures and checkpoints? Or as suggested by
some racist Israelis population transfer of Arab citizens of Israel to
the Palestinian Authority and possibly mass transfer of Arab
Palestinians somewhere else?
On the important issues dividing Israelis from
Palestinians, Israel insists that it has no responsibility whatsoever to
the creation of the Palestinian Refugee problem. It denies, with an
overwhelming approval of almost all Israelis, the Right of Return of
Palestinian Refugees. On the question of Jerusalem, Israel sees the
entirety of the city as its eternal capital: no one dares to ask how
long eternal is eternal? Israel also expresses, through its diplomats
and some of its politicians, inability of dealing with the powerful bloc
represented by the Jewish settlers in the West Bank and the Golan
Heights which means that any territorial compromises would need lots of
convincing and could in effect torpedo serious peace efforts. Israel
also controls water and other resources of the West Bank and would not
want to let go of them.
At present, Israel uses the argument, as expressed
recently by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, that there is no Palestinian
counterpart who is capable of making peace. This is at best an attempt
by Israel to once again miss an opportunity to make peace or to offer a
genuine vision of peace based on mutual negotiations. Israel intent is
really not bent on ending its occupation and living side by side with
Palestinians on the basis of good neighborliness, justice and respect
for basic rights to self determination. The response and some lip
service given by some Israeli politicians to the Arab Peace Initiative
adopted by consensus of the Arab Summit Conference in Riyadh Saudi
Arabia in March 2007 illustrates the unwillingness of the Israeli body
politic to engage in serious negotiations on all outstanding issues
including the Right of Return, Jerusalem and the establishment of a
viable Palestinian state in control of its resources and destiny. I
remember the time when Israelis and pro-Israeli sympathizers used to
argue that Palestinians and Arabs never miss an opportunity to miss an
opportunity: on the surface of it, at least, Israeli politicians
nowadays are missing another opportunity. The big question is what are
they waiting for? Would conditions for Israel become any better? Do they
rely on forces and factors of which we and the rest of the world are
oblivious? Where would they take Israel to and could the Jewish state
survive continued hegemony over another people and its destiny?
Difficult questions that only Israelis and their politician can answer.
Certainly help is needed but help, though necessary, is not sufficient:
only Israeli conviction that an end to occupation, the establishment of
a viably sovereign Palestinian state, the recognition of the Refugee
Right of Return and the sharing of Jerusalem as an open city, capital of
two states, would guarantee that Israel would live in peace and
security. There is no other way as the way of force and military might
can work for some time but it will not work in the long run.
Second, the Palestinian factor: the
latest developments in the Palestinian Territories evoke strong emotions
among all Palestinians particularly since the infighting is “detrimental
to the aspirations of the Palestinian people,” as the urgent call of the
Heads of Churches in Jerusalem released on June 14th
emphasizes. The factional infighting, though, should be viewed in its
larger context. Upon the elections of a majority of Hamas members to the
Palestinian Legislative Council in January 2006, an opinion poll of
those who voted for Hamas showed that 75% of them believed that the new
government should hold peace talks with Israel. The international
boycott of the Hamas led government which lasted till March 2007 when
the Unity Government was formed, did play a role in increasing the gulf
between Hamas and the secular forces among Palestinians, including Fatah.
With economic boycott, employees’ strike of vital health and educational
sectors among other services, the feeling of insecurity and want
experienced by a majority of working Palestinians all contributed to
disappointment, frustration and willingness to confront each other. The
aim of the boycott was to weaken Hamas and to get it to submit to the
three demands of the Quartet: ending violence; recognition of Israel and
acceptance of previous agreements including the road map. This, in
effect, did not materialize; on the contrary, Hamas grew stronger while
the national authority appeared unable to effectively manage the
challenges posed by the boycott and to strategically deal with the Hamas
electoral victory as part of the new Palestinian political realities
which join the religious with the secular. The polarization between
Hamas and Fatah and other secular political groups led to a situation in
which the Palestinian political system became unsustainable and needed
outside intervention. This grew particularly evident with sporadic
martial confrontations between Hamas and Fatah in the Gaza Strip. Egypt
with the presence of a military mission headed by an army General did
all it could to contain internecine fighting; Jordan offered all it
could to calm things down and offered humanitarian aid regularly, Syria
also undertook to talk to the Hamas leadership present in Damascus and
to Ismail Hanieh, the Palestinian Prime Minister, on the need to have
unity among Palestinians. The Saudis, seeing the precarious situation,
invited both Hamas and Fatah leaderships to a historic meeting in Mecca
in February 2007. After two days of intensive Saudi sponsored talks, the
two parties agreed to form a government of National Unity. By March 17
2007 when the new government won an overwhelming vote of confidence in
the Palestinian Legislative Council, it was expected that the Quartet
and in fact the international community would go forward and offer
recognition to the new government. This did not happen except for
Norway, not a member state in the EU that reiterated upon the
establishment of economic and political relations with the new Unity
Government the demands to end violence, to recognize Israel’s right to
exist and to respect basic international standards as regards compliance
with previously concluded agreements.
Israel persists in not
transferring the tax and custom money it collects on behalf of the
national authority as a means of not accepting the unity government. The
money amounts to little more than US$700 million and makes up more than
50% of all yearly income needed to enable the National Authority to
function properly. The blocking of this money more than pressuring Hamas
has really caused troubles to the entirety of the National Authority
especially as it has become a destabilizing disastrous factor that
played into factional infighting. This Israeli policy of tax blocking is
part of an international boycott spearheaded by the US which according
to a recently published confidential report of UN General Secretary
special representative, Alvaro de Soto former Peruvian foreign minister,
“has made the Middle East peace process subservient to wider policies on
Iraq and Iran, and that the US had got the other members of the Quartet
negotiating team – the EU, Russia and the UN – to impose sanctions on
the government formed after painful negotiations between Fatah and Hamas.”
But lest one falls into
the trap of defending Palestinian positions, irrespective of
shortcomings, one needs also to view the polarity that is in the
Palestinian body politic with respect to relations with the Israeli
occupation. Since Oslo accords in 1993
a majority of Palestinians in the
Occupied Territories have opted for a pragmatic approach in trying to
resolve the outstanding political impasse with Israel. This pragmatism
is represented by secular groups and factions, including a good number
in Fatah. These groups, though, never relinquished their right to oppose
and resist occupation. These groups also insist on the exercise of the
Palestinian people of its inalienable rights, including the Right of
Return, Jerusalem as capital of the Palestinian State and the full sovereignty of a
Palestinian State over its people and land, including
water and other resources. The ongoing daily arrests and targeted
killings by Israel in the West Bank of Fatah Aqsa Brigades members
attest to the ongoing commitment of Fatah and other secular groups to
the liberation from Israeli occupation. But the overall political
orientation of these secular groups speaks of a national liberation
struggle which would adopt resistance side by side with negotiations in
order to accomplish its goals. Respect for Oslo has long disappeared
among most Palestinians, but the essential objective of ending
occupation remains paramount by all means possible, including
negotiations. The end goal is to establish a secular pluralistic
Palestinian society in which all citizens are equal before the law and
enjoy same responsibilities, obligations and rights.
On the Hamas side, the
legitimacy of the existence of Israel is put into question, principally
from a religious perspective. Hence there is no recognition of Israel
and continuing fighting is called for until full liberation of the land
which is considered waqf or Islamic trust in perpetuity. Hamas offers
Israel a temporary truce, Hudna, and is willing to honor this truce for
a period of time, say ten years, upon the full withdrawal of Israel from
all occupied territories, including East Jerusalem. The offer of Hudna
would keep Hamas loyal to its charter of looking at the entire land of
Palestine as an Islamic trust that can never be negotiated or
relinquished. But while the Hudna would maneuver Hamas out of a
politically impossible position, the religious basis of Hamas ideology
poses some serious concern for all Palestinian secularists, considering
that an overwhelming majority of the Palestinian people does not want a
religious state. The argument offered by some Hamas leaders that the
people will decide democratically on the institution of a religious
state does not stand for a test, especially after the events of the last
few days in the Gaza Strip. When Hamas is pressured, its response is to
launch initiatives that would use force or military might. Granted that
this would also be the response of other factions and political groups
but these groups would be reined in by over imposing legal, political,
security and other institutions. In the latest Gaza
fighting, it appears that the Hamas military wing took to the streets
and acted out a strategy that was not necessarily in concert with some
in the political wing. Crimes have been committed by all combatants in
the Gaza Strip, these crimes point to the danger that the absence of
governing institutions could lead all of us in Palestinian society.
But what is the
situation after the dissolution of the national unity government by Mr.
Mahmoud Abbas? And what are the prospects for a peaceful resolution of
the internal dissension and of the core Arab-Israeli conflict? There are
different scenarios that one can project: one that is already happening
is the closing of the two major population crossings, Rafah in the South
with Egypt and Erez in the North with Israel. This would be coupled with
closing the commercial crossings, such as Al Montar / Karni Crossing
that is considered according to Paltrade, the Palestine Trade Center,
the lifeline of the Gaza Strip. Monitoring the crossing of goods and
commodities both ways, Paltrade documents the importance and need of
this crossing point for the Gaza Strip. If this crossing were to be
closed for a considerable period of time then we would have a serious
situation of lack of essential supplies and commodities in the Gaza
Strip.
Another scenario would
speak of total separation of the Gaza Strip from the West Bank and hence
the functioning of two parallel governments. This would deal a blow to
the political maneuvering of Palestinians on the issue of advancing the
peace negotiations prospects forward. Already, Palestinians are in a
weak position due, in part to our inability to come to terms with each
other’s agendas and failure to unify our differences in one overarching
national agenda. But this is not solely our work as the boycott imposed
and outside interference of broader agendas have led us to procrastinate
over molding a joint national vision that would combine both the
religious with the secular; the struggle-oriented with the
politically-pragmatic, the social and institutional reconstruction with
a plan for overall reform and rehabilitation. The situation of parallel
governments would see most of the international community supporting
President Abbas and his newly appointed emergency government headed by
Salam Fayyad while the Gaza government would be confronted with a series
of insurmountable economic, social, health and educational challenges
which would be further complicated if the Hamas faction decides on
military confrontation with Israel through Qassam rockets and other
military means.
A third scenario is for
the Arab League and particular Arab States to offer negotiation options
between Hamas and Fatah. These, regardless of how well intentioned, will
last for months and hence the current stalemate would continue to the
detriment of our national cause. An international “peace keeping” force
that would make confrontation with the Hamas militant one of its
objectives will not solve the impasse. There must be willingness on the
Hamas faction to recognize the legitimate role of the Presidency of the
Palestinian National Authority and to respect decision making processes
and the institutional make up of the National Authority without using
the electoral victory of January 2006 as a ploy to excuse whatever
position Hamas adopts. On the other hand, a return to normalcy would
stress the essential role of the elected Palestinian Legislative Council
and the need by Israel to release all members of the Palestinian
Legislative imprisoned as well as those ministers who are illegally
being held in Israeli prisons. All political factions need to cooperate
and there is clearly a distinct input for Fatah in the process. Without
national reconciliation and healing, there will not be internal peace in
Palestine for some time to come. The principal challenge for Mr. Abbas
is to create the conditions, in spite of the current difficulties and
apparent irreconcilability of positions, to bring all factions together
and to reestablish the unity of the Palestinian Territories under the auspices of the
National Authority and its legitimate institutions, including
particularly the Palestinian Legislative Council or Parliament.
Third, the Arab
factor: The Mecca Agreement
between Fatah and Hamas in February 2007 reflects the serious concerns
and efforts exerted by the Saudi King and Government in order to make
for rapprochement between the two positions and to make the formation of
a national unity government a reality. One of the primary motives was to
stop the shedding of Palestinian blood by Palestinians. In March 2007
the Arab Summit of Heads of States adopted in Riyadh in Saudi Arabia the
Arab Peace Initiative based on UN Resolutions 242 adopted by UN Security
Council on November 22 1967 and which calls for “the establishment of a
just and lasting peace in the Middle East.” The resolution also
stipulated "Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces
from territories occupied in the recent conflict" and "Termination of
all claims or states of belligerency" and respect for the right of every
state in the area to live in peace within secure and recognised
boundaries. The Arab Peace Initiative is also based on
General Assembly Resolution 194 passed on December 11, 1948 with 15
articles of which the most relevant to the Arab Peace Initiative is
Article 11 which states: “the refugees wishing to return to their homes
and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at
the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for
the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage
to property which, under principles of international law or in equity,
should be made good by the Government or authorities responsible.” This
Arab initiative adopted by consensus shows the willingness of Arab
States to recognize Israel if it would withdraw from all Arab
Territories captured in the June War of 1967, including East Jerusalem
and if it recognizes the Right of Return to Palestinian Refugees.
As indicated above the
Israeli position, both on the popular and governmental levels, refuses
to acknowledge any responsibility for the causation of the Palestinian
refugee problem. Also the Israeli position does not leave space for
sharing Jerusalem in spite of the fact that the Palestinian position is
that the city of Jerusalem should be an open city accessible to all with
the shared city capital for the two states of Palestine and Israel
simultaneously.
Aside from a political position that shows
pragmatism and desire to see a just and lasting solution to the
Palestinian problem, the Arab States and in particular Egypt and Jordan
have worked in various ways to advance the prospects of internal
Palestinian peace and to facilitate on Palestinians in terms of living
conditions and mobility in and out of the Occupied Territories in
pursuit of needed personal wants. Egypt has stationed a high level
security mission in its embassy in Gaza, which unfortunately was
withdrawn upon the fighting in the Gaza Strip. Previously, Egypt was
actively engaged in Palestinian inter factional talks and discussions
aimed at bolstering the public peace and at helping the Palestinians
arrive at a joint national agenda. Jordan has also taken a leading
advocacy role, beside humanitarian and other forms of aid to the
Palestinian people, as exemplified by HM King Abdullah address to
Congress on March 9, 2007 in which HM said that “public confidence in
the peace process has dropped, the cycle of crises is spinning faster,
and with greater potential for destruction. Changing military doctrine
and weaponry pose new dangers. Increasing numbers of external actors are
intervening with their own strategic agendas, raising new dangers of
proliferation and crisis.” His Majesty emphasized that “the
wellspring of regional division, the source of resentment and
frustration far beyond, is the denial of justice and peace in Palestine.”
Other Arab countries have all pulled their influence and financial
powers in order to facilitate the progress in inter Palestinian
relations. Thus the Arab role has been positive, albeit of the US and
other pressures, that aimed at containing this role and at making it
subservient to more global and regional strategies.
Fourth, the EU factor: the best
categorization of the role of the EU is that of the philanthropist
always anxious to attend to the wounds of the moment but lacking the
will, because of US pressure, to act on long term healing. There are
different agendas in the EU perhaps best illustrated by the German and
UK positions. Germany ever aware of the past actively pursues an agenda
that would see Israel secure and the creation of satisfactory
conditions, such as the release of Israeli soldiers on the Palestinian
and Arab sides that would prod Israel forward on its own schedule and
preference. The UK, on the other hand, because of the particular
“strategic” relations that exist with Washington and its felt
responsibility for the Palestinian problem, has taken the position that
something concrete should develop in the resolution of the Arab-Israeli
conflict that would eventually have positive repercussions overall in
the region, given UK involvement in Iraq. The insistence of the exiting
PM to make some advances in the peace process was more for restoring
some personal prestige but, according to analysts, was not based on any
realizable position.
But the EU, concerned lest the impact of the
international boycott would have negative repercussions on its own self,
has instituted the Temporary International Mechanisms which aim at
providing cash assistance to thousands of Palestinian families. The TIM
as it became known does not substitute for direct support for the
Palestinian government but attempts to ease the conditions of life
particularly to those Palestinians working in the health sector. To the
acknowledgement of Mr. Fayyad Finance Minister in the just dissolved
national unity government and PM designate in the emergency government,
TIM helps in covering some of the wages and financial obligations of the
National Authority towards its own employees thus supplementing efforts
at providing needed cash.
Europe nevertheless remains paralyzed in terms of
independent input into the peace process as its subservience to American
politics is apparent to all but especially to us here in the Middle
East. Efforts at euro-med type conferences and joint exercises which
involve all in the Middle East are not to be discounted but these
efforts provide no exit strategy to the ills and tribulations visited on
our peoples and the region by ongoing conflict, especially in our case
the Arab-Israeli conflict. The normalization of relations between Arabs
and Israelis and the work at the root cause of conflict between
Palestinians and Israelis would demand the active commitment of EU to
ending Israeli occupation and to respecting the UN resolutions on the
rights of the Palestinian people and its entitlement to establish a
viable and sovereign Palestinian state in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and
East Jerusalem.
Fifth: the US factor: the United
States has lost its credibility as an honest broker between Palestinians
and Israelis. In spite of all efforts and financial support over the
last several years, the United States remains limited, out of its own
entanglement in Iraq and the internal political interests on Capitol
Hill influenced by the Christian Right and the pro Israel lobby, to
effect real transformation on the ground in Palestine/Israel. In early
May US Security Coordinator Major General Keith Dayton presented
“confidence-building benchmarks” to both Israel and the National
Authority. These benchmarks were intended to prod Israel, on the one
hand, to ease travel restrictions in the West Bank and Gaza in stages
and to invite the Palestinian Authority to take specific steps against
arms smuggling into Gaza and to develop a plan by June to stop missile
firings into Israel by militants in Gaza. But even on these benchmarks,
official Washington was not unanimous especially when Israel did not
accept them. The Israeli refusal of the benchmarks led General Dayton to
criticize Israel publicly for its failure to define a “security horizon”
for the Palestinians and its refusal to ease conditions in the
Palestinian Authority.
Washington needs to bolster the pragmatic Arab
regimes, particularly at a time when Iraq has gone back hundreds of
years into tribal, religious and ethnic abyss. The values that the US
has traditionally inspired have become subservient to strategic military
considerations. These have created such mistrust that some in the
American Administration believe that progress on the resolution of the
Arab-Israeli conflict would reemphasize the role of the US as peacemaker
and not as principal adversary in the region. Certainly what is
happening in Gaza as a result of internal Palestinian infighting would
give a respite to the US Administration and would slow the urgency of
seeking political resolution to the conflict. The infighting also
provides the US with an excellent alibi for not doing enough towards
pressuring Israel to take on its responsibility on resolving the
conflict. Nor would the US at the present pursue efforts towards
exploring the Arab Peace Initiative more in depth.
Accordingly, the US is left with its war in Iraq
and with its lower ability to influence Israel and with the Middle East
in limbo particularly in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine. One could conclude
that the US is at its lowest ebb of influence in our region particularly
as its military power is at its greatest in the entire region. But to go
back to US relations to the Palestinians, it is apparent that the US,
together with the international community, would lend their support to
the legitimacy of the Palestinian Presidency as represented by Mahmoud
Abbas and the emergency government. But this is not enough as efforts
are needed to get the Palestinians to unify their ranks and to
reconcile. The US has an important role in these efforts but there is
doubt that it would opt for unity of the Palestinians as its goals and
objectives are to isolate Hamas, particularly if Hamas remains for a
military confrontation with Israel.
What is Needed?
- On the Israeli side, a vision for peace that
would see an end to its occupation of Palestinian lands, control over
the Palestinian population and hegemony over water and other resources
in the West Bank. This vision should include the stopping of illegal
settlements and their expansion and the relocation of Jewish settlers
to inside Israel. Israel should also make a series of good will
gestures or benchmarks such as the immediate release of Palestinian
legislators and government ministers who were illegally imprisoned as
well as key prisoners such as Marwan Barghouti and Ahmad Jaradat.
- On the Palestinian side, an internal vision of
unity and recognition of the legitimate institutions of the
Palestinian National Authority by all factions. In particular the
Presidential Institution which has the support of a majority of
Palestinians should be duly recognized and respected. There could be
no prospects for internal peace and return to normalcy if the Gaza
Strip and West Bank continue to be separate and parallel governments.
- On the Arab side, continued involvement in
Palestinian affairs in order to bring the Palestinians closer to each
other and to provide needed assistance, especially if conditions in
the Gaza Strip would further deteriorate, as is expected. Egypt,
Jordan and Saudi Arabia have a vital role to play together and in
conjunction with the Arab League and their role should be supported
and encouraged by the international community. The Arab Peace
Initiative should remain a pan-Arab agenda and all Arab States should
be encouraged to do all they can to bring this Initiative persistently
to the attention of international community and to particular states.
- On the European side, the philanthropy of Europe
is truly appreciated but we would like to see Europe more involved in
pursuing peace forward. This is the essential challenge: how to end
Israeli occupation and establish a viable Palestinian state. All
symbolic getting together between Arabs, Israelis and Europeans will
not advance peace prospects if there is no clear political agenda for
peace making.
- On the American side, much needs to be done in
order to bring peace forward. Hegemonic political agendas that are
oblivious to the rights of Palestinians and others in the region will
continue to bring disaster after disaster. Appeal to US values sounds
an easy proposition but addressing vital US interests may be more
realistic when the US is to become committed to initiate peace and to
pressure parties for advancement in this sphere. Much is expected from
the American Administration but unfortunately delivery remains quite
limited and frustrating to a majority of Palestinians and Arabs in
this region.
Allow me at the end to mention the role of
peacemakers and many distinguished peacemakers are present here today.
Religious leaders of all persuasions have an important role to play in
bringing the Palestinian tragedy to a positive and forward looking
close. The distinguished gathering represented by this International
Peace Conference: Churches Together for Peace and Justice in the Middle
East is an affirmation of the place and role of religious leadership to
bring peace and hope closer. At a time when super powers and important
world players are becoming delinquent in pursuing the possible peace, a
distinguished gathering such as this is a reminder that things cannot
let go and that different alternatives present themselves and they
should be pursued by all. Understanding the complexities of the current
impasse on all sides should enable us here to chart a course that would
expedite the exercise of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian
people through an end to Israeli occupation and the establishment of a
Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital. The foundation of
such a state would herald an era of stability, security and good
neighborliness to all in this region and would enable the children,
irrespective of nationality, religion or ethnicity, to work for a better
and more prosperous future to each and every one of them.
May the Peace that shone in Bethlehem 2001 years
ago help you all in your efforts at making peace in Bethlehem and in
Palestine a reality.
Dr. Bernard Sabella
PLC Member
DSPR/MECC
Jerusalem
June 16th 2007
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