Sen. Kerry on Annapolis and Next Administration (opening statement)

“…It's obviously hard to overstate the importance of bringing about a lasting peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians. This is important to everybody concerned, directly by living in the region or indirectly because of their connections to the region and because of our mutual security concerns as a consequence. The vast majority of the people of Israel and the Palestinian people share the goal of bringing two states living side by side into peaceful and secure existence. And the question is what we can do to help get them there…

…we know that successful negotiations are going to require a redoubled commitment to sustained high-level engagement by the United States. This must be an absolute top priority for the next administration. I'm confident that it will be…”

Sec. Welch on Annapolis Progress (opening statement)

“Annapolis was a path-breaking event. And since then we've tried to work along four tracks to support broadening the Arab-Israeli peace, but especially focusing on the Palestinian track…

…these are the first meaningful permanent status negotiations between Israel and Palestinians in nearly a decade. I believe that they are very substantial and that they're -- both parties are committed to them.

The fact that there isn't much in the way of public statements or agreements that have been announced or articulated should not be mistaken for a lack of progress…

In the negotiations, sir, since the United States is a sponsor and on occasion sits in trilateral meetings with the party, we have accepted the responsibility of confidentiality in that process, but there are some things I can say about it in a public forum. There are advances. It's not a trivial thing to say that the parties have common aspirations. I know that sounds like diplospeak, but to define the goal and to think about ways in which to arrive at it is the essence of a negotiating process, and this one is real and under way. They want a comprehensive agreement on all the issues.

You mentioned the core issues, and that is an aspiration, as articulated in Annapolis to address it comprehensively, without exception. They have pledged to continue these bilateral, confidential and continuous negotiations until they get their goal. We would like to see them realize that goal as soon as possible. I work for this administration, so we'd like to see it in this administration, but we have a Hippocratic oath to make sure that we carry it forward if that needs to be the case.

The negotiating structure that is there is effective, productive, real and I believe it will be kept in place, because, at least on the Israeli side, current Foreign Minister Livni, who may form a government in Israel, is now well-schooled in the whole effort and is personally committed to it.

I -- our president has put out there for the first time from an American president an articulated goal of U.S. policy that there should be a Palestinian state. We believe that would be in the interests of Israel and its security. We believe it would be in the interests of the United States and our security, and of course we believe it would be in the interest of Palestinians.

That's not going to come in a single dramatic moment but only methodical effort to do this. We've spent a lot of time both building to Annapolis and in the virtually one year since. I hope you would agree it is a serious effort. This is not because we want an accolade or a recognition, but because of the importance of this goal of comprehensive peace.

I believe that we should stay that course. Thank you very much.”   

Sen. Kerry and Sec. Welch on Annapolis Expectations and Two-State Solution

Kerry: “..So can you give us a sense today of what we who follow this and think about it a lot ought to be expecting…?”

Sec. Welch: “I will try to do so. I think it's important at the outset to make a distinction between what's going on in the negotiations which are bilateral and confidential and U.S. policy on any given point that might be an element in the negotiations.

Let me begin with sketching where I think things are. First of all, you know, there's a high sense of expectation whenever you mention this issue in the context of negotiations, but we need to remember that since the collapse of U.S.-led efforts in -- at the end of 2000, there really hasn't been a negotiation on the permanent status issues until the last nine months. And again, that period, there's lots of reasons for why that happened and it was a terribly difficult period for the parties, but the collapse in confidence and morale on the part of people on both sides to undertake this was very considerable. So it was no small achievement to reverse that, get people focused again on what is the goal. That's one point.

Second point, what is that goal? There should be two states and one will be a state called Palestine. You know, it's within our lifetimes and our political understanding that the concept of a Palestine was alien.

Now it's an articulated goal. And both parties-”

Kerry: “With all due respect, Mr. Secretary, for those of us, I mean, you know, I've been here for 24 years now following this thing. That's not a big deal right now. I mean, that ground was broken a long time ago…

But this notion that everybody has decided they want two states doesn't satisfy anybody anymore, in terms of an accomplishment or a big change. I mean, that's six years, eight years old.

The debate now is over, how Swiss cheesy is this state going to look? And what sort of, you know, rights and access are going to go with it, et cetera? And what happens to the settlements and so forth?

So I think what we need is a better sense of, you know, are these talks currently being undertaken going to come up with some, in your judgment, specific agreements that reinforce the steps of the road map? Are they going to be different from the road map? Are they going to be agreements in principle on some larger issues, leaving out the most thorny ones? Or could we expect something more comprehensive?”   

Welch: “…speaking about the parties themselves, Senator, they have laid out that they want a comprehensive agreement. By that, they mean no partial agreements or no steps along the way that would prejudice their ability to arrive at a comprehensive agreement. That's an important understanding right now between the two that are negotiating, because from time to time there are other ideas floated out there about way stations on the way to a real peace treaty.

Third, they subscribe to the idea that this should be continuous, confidential and bilateral, which I expect will mean that it can be made irreversible, too, so that you can make progress but you don't go back to a situation where it gets thrown out if one or the other party changes or some of those watching the outside change their approach.

You asked about the road map. They have a common understanding that even though they're negotiating permanent status now, if they arrive at an agreement, it's only implemented in accordance with the road map. That's important, because the sequentiality of the road map had always been a question.

Finally, they committed in Annapolis to negotiate on the core issues without exception, and that is the purpose of this negotiation. In terms of our approach to it, we have joined them in saying it ought to be confidential, so I won't be one of those who puts out there elements of this.”   

Welch and Kerry on Settlements

Welch: “…On the Israeli side, we are very concerned, as you pointed out, about settlement activity. I think that's -- even beyond being a road map obligation, it's prejudicial to the kind of climate of confidence that's necessary to sustain a negotiation, and implicates potential final status issues. And that's worrisome to see.”

Kerry: “Can you share with us what -- what perpetuates that as a ongoing source of tension, obviously, between us and our friends? It's been the policy of our country for years that that's quote, ‘unacceptable,’ but it has never changed what happens.”

Welch: “Well, I -- you're right in the sense that our policy, though one of expressing concern and opposition to settlement activity, while at the same time raising what it implies for –

Kerry: “I'm distinguishing, incidentally, between building within those areas immediately around Jerusalem, which are already, by everybody's acceptance, within the annexation concept, versus those areas that might be out by the Jordan River Valley or elsewhere.”

Welch: “Well, most of the settlement activity that we can observe is concentrated west of the fence or barrier that Israel has put up for what are described as security purposes. Though there is activity elsewhere, it's modest.

You know, I know I'm not here to answer for why Israeli would continue doing this. I don't think the international community makes the distinction, and the United States doesn't. We're concerned because this activity -- it harms the confidence of people. It undermines the morale of folks when they see this happening. And at the same time, it's a bit of a political football in Israel, too.”   

Hagel and Welch on state of Middle East today and U.S. Policy

Hagel: “…You have said things like people need to see progress to develop confidence. There is a sense of morale that's important in all this. They have to see their lives getting better in the Middle East, or wherever in the world, when there has been despair and war, conflict.

And as I evaluate the last eight years in the Middle East, I come to a conclusion that the Middle East today is more dangerous, more complicated more combustible, more unstable than maybe ever, but certainly more than any time in the last years…

…You know, and I get to the Middle East fairly often. And when people see, in Israel and the West Bank, more checkpoints, more settlements, as Senator Kerry has noted, eight years ago, there wasn't a fence.

And by the way, I make these evaluations not assigning any responsibility or blame to any particular country or leader or individual. But I think I'm stating a pretty good inventory of fact here.

So how do we break this? For example, Hamas: Do we think Hamas just fades away? Are we willing to deal with Hamas? Or how are we going to deal with Hamas? I don't think they're going to just assume that they're going to be in any deal.

Why, for example, you talked about Turkey brokering an engagement with Israel and Syria. Why didn't we do that?

If that's so important to this administration, obviously enough that you're taking some credit for it in your commentary, why don't we have an ambassador there? Why are we still withholding our ambassador?...”   

Welch: “…the Middle East is a dangerous, complicated and combustible place, sir.

That said, if we only look at the trouble spots in the Middle East -- and I think, of course, duty obliges us, most days, to do that -- we are missing a bigger picture. Much of the Middle East is quite stable. It is not inhospitable. It is not combustible. And relations with the United States, most countries in that area, are pretty good…

…Much of our discussion today, of course, has been about the Israeli-Palestinian issue, and again, I think the return to negotiations is pretty fundamental. Would I like to see more progress on some of the things you mentioned? Absolutely.

I do believe that it's important not to overrate the political power of Hamas within Palestine. They won an election for the legislative council by a plurality, which was less than the majority that Abu Mazen won when he ran for president.

I don't know how the next election will fare, but the example that they've shown to Palestinians in Gaza is hardly an inspiring one, and there's some evidence to suggest it has not really taken hold in the West Bank either, where the political balance still remains quite a bit different.

I believe that any new administration, sir, ought to address this issue as a matter of priority, and obviously I'd like to prepare it as well as possible for them when that day comes. I think the experience of the last years has taught us that you can't single out any one of these problems alone and leave it unaddressed. It requires an effort across the board. And particularly in the last years, we've tried to apply that. It's an ambitious agenda, I know, and I'd hardly be here to tell you we've succeeded on all parts of it, but I think we've made a good effort.”   

Hagel and Welch on Syria and Hamas and Hezbollah

Hagel: “…On Syria, if in fact we, as you have noted, are encouraging the Turks with their incentives, regarding Israel and Syria; if in fact as I have been told directly by Prime Minister Olmert, on two different occasions over the last two years, that engaging Syria is clearly in the interest of Israel, for obvious reasons, then I'm not sure how we then play much of a role in this, standing on the sideline with no opportunity to help incentivize a change in behavior…

…Let me go to the Hamas and Hezbollah issues for a moment, because you tell me how we deal with this. You tell me how we are going to find ways to position Abbas, Fatah, whoever's in charge to give them some upper hands -- Lebanon -- in facing the reality of these two organizations. Obviously, Iran is connected into a good deal of this. So what would be your thought on -- take Hamas. We just let it go? We think they will just self-destruct? Where will we go? What do we do? They are a reality.”

Welch: “…Hamas and Hezbollah -- sir, you're right -- are realities. They have a certain level of political support in their communities. And interestingly, both the Palestinian community and Lebanon are among the most politically open and emancipated in the Middle East in the sense that they do have votes and the votes are reasonably honest and some good people win and sometimes they don't.

It's not the principle that they should have a vote that is an issue for us, even though that's aroused some anxiety in some places sometimes. It's their policies that concerns us. And we don't have to accept that their policy is a reality that is impermeable to change -- impervious to change. What we're trying to do is, if they can't figure out what the best thing to do for their people is, then maybe their people can make a different decision, vote for someone else or make a course correction themselves.

In the meantime, as I alluded to earlier -- maybe I wasn't clear enough -- I believe that the moderate center in both these communities is more substantial than the minorities associated with these groups. So it's very important to give them the authority, the power, the capability that they seek within their society so that they can rebalance them. That requires an investment of American resources, too…

…The alternative, to sort of say, ‘Well, gee, can't do anything about that because they're there, they're armed, they're dangerous, and we have to cope with that reality,’ I think would be, frankly, premature capitulation. And I don't think that the moderates would want to do that and they would feel abandoned by the United States were we to, even by our inaction, suggest that that would be the alternative.

Whether this will work, I don't know, because at the end of the day in -- let's take the Palestinian territories, for example -- people want to see change. So they'll reward those who are going to bring them the kind of change they want to see. And unfortunately, they've been through a long period of militancy there and it's had its effect on politics.

Now it's being recalibrated. I believe we have the best and most encouraging Palestinian government in a long time there. They've taken substantial political risk and personal risk to move things ahead. And we have to help them…”

Hagel and Welch on Lessons Learned

Hagel: “What would you say -- you mentioned lessons learned in some of your statements. What would you say would be the most significant lessons we've learned, should have learned on this Arab- Israeli issue over the last eight years? How would you frame the future? How are you going to -- how are you going to advise the next secretary of State and president as to what should be the policy over the next four years? What are we -- what should we do differently? Anything? Did we learn anything?...”

Welch: “Sir, I would use three very straightforward words: priority, investment and results. We have to make this a priority. It will require an investment. And I mean that in a real sense, not just a diplomatic sense. And number three, it's an imperative to produce results, because results count.

We've been through a long drought.

I believe -- I'm not disagreeing with you that it is -- there are all these difficulties, sir, but I believe there is an opportunity here, particularly in the last year that we've rebuilt the negotiation. But it's not complete, and it can be challenged, and it can be shaken. I don't even dismiss that it could be reversed. I think that is very dangerous.

The idea of two states is potentially at risk under those circumstances, and I don't see an alternative here.

We will have a transition process that, happily, in my department, I can say, I think will be reasonably well organized, sir. And I'll have a chance to provide plenty of advice. But I would say in this context that those were the three things that I would try and say to the new team: Give it a priority, put some serious effort on the table, and expect and demand results.”

Hagel: “Within that, I didn't hear anything different that you would suggest, because I assume what you have said we have been doing and what you've just said we should be doing is a continuation of the three principles that you laid out, which I assume you think we've been doing, and putting forth effort and prioritization. I assume those -- we're doing those.”

Welch: “We are.”

Hagel: “If -- you wouldn't see anything different, then?”

Welch: “We are doing these things and -- I'm sorry. I thought you had asked me about what to advise the next folks –“

Hagel: “Well, basically, does that mean we just keep doing what we're doing?”

Welch: “Well, yes, but –“

Hagel: “Nothing different. Nothing new.”

Welch: “That's certainly necessary. It may not be sufficient. We have, what, three and a half, three months, more or less, still left.

And what I would like to see is productive effort. And we're not stopping as of November 5. We stop at 12:01, January 20th for this administration. And I'm a professional diplomat. There will be others like me around who try to carry on throughout the national security bureaucracy, for that matter. And we can do things between now and then. And, I mean, there's some things that we have under way right now where I still believe that there's room for progress and you might even, if you took a look at them, see them as innovative.”

Hagel and Welch on Annapolis Results

Hagel: “…What results do you think are possible over the next three and a half months?”

Welch: “Well, I would like to see, bearing in mind that Israel has to compose its new political leadership, that this negotiating track that we've embarked on and to support does move ahead. Ideally, it would produce an agreement. If it doesn't, it must be continued, and continued on a substantial basis. So we try to build that every single day. I think it has to be done carefully and quietly, but that is, in my judgment, incredibly important…”

Hagel: “…What's possible, in your opinion -- as you have noted, still possible -- the next three and a half months, as a result of –“

Welch: “Well, I think we can make progress on -- in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. And I believe that what Senator Kerry said -- there's a bit of a pause, but it's not a halt. And I do believe there is a way to do this in a measured, careful, confidential way.”

Hagel: “Well, do you believe that over the next three and a half months we can get an agreement that takes us to a higher ground position?”

Welch: “Well, that's a good question, and I want to be careful in answering it. There is a difference between possibility and probability.

I think it's really important, Senator Hagel, to have a lofty objective out there. You know, if you sell yourself short, you're not going to encourage parties who already have a difficulty in cooperating and working with one another to try and move forward. So it's good to have an ambitious goal. It increases leverage.

We'd like to attain that. Whether we will is another question. But I don't think we should pull back from that goal. And to the degree we can make progress toward it, I believe that we should make that progress irreversible, so it can be transferred over…”